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Abstract: To what extent can we rely on others for information without such reliance becoming epis-
temically problematic? In this paper, this question is addressed in terms of a specific form of reliance: 
cognitive outsourcing. Cognitive outsourcing involves handing over (outsourcing) one’s information 
collection and processing (the cognitive) to others. The specific question that will be asked about such 
outsourcing is if there is an epistemic problem about cognitive outsourcing as such. To ask if there is 
an epistemic problem with x for S is to ask if x is a problem for S’s ability to acquire true belief and 
avoid false belief. To ask if there is a problem for S with x as such is to ask if it is impossible to solve 
the problem for S while leaving x as is. I argue that, if we consider the five most plausible candidate 
epistemic problems raised by cognitive outsourcing—i.e., unreliability, gullibility, irrationality, de-
pendency, and lack of epistemic autonomy—we see for each candidate that it is either not an epistemic 
problem, or not a problem about cognitive outsourcing as such. 
 
 
1. Introduction 
It has become something of a trope in recent epistemology to point out that we depend in sig-
nificant and often unavoidable ways on others for the great majority of what we know.
2
 The 
trope is certainly well motivated, given that we are epistemically dependent on others to a 
very high degree. But to what extent can we rely on others without such reliance becoming 
epistemically problematic? In this paper, I will address this question in terms of a specific 
form of reliance to be referred to as cognitive outsourcing.  
                                                     
1
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 Goldman (1999), Coady (1992) and Hardwig (1985) have all been instrumental in bringing our epis-
temic dependence on others to the fore of epistemological theorising. That dependence has been inves-
tigated more recently in relation to testimony (e.g., Lackey and Sosa 2006; Lackey 2008; Goldberg 
2010) and peer disagreement (e.g., Feldman and Warfield 2010; Christensen and Lackey 2013), alt-
hough some of the themes stretch all the way back to Hume and Reid. 
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One engages in cognitive outsourcing to the extent that one hands over (outsources) 
one’s information collection and processing (the cognitive) to others. In order to make clear 
exactly what kind of cognitive outsourcing I will be concerned with in what follows, let us 
consider a specific, hypothetical scenario. Consider a person, let us call him Ted, who learns a 
great many things about the world from online sources, but knows nothing whatsoever about 
their epistemic credentials. With respect to the topics on which he consults his online sources, 
Ted conducts no (further) information collection, nor any processing of the input he receives 
from his sources, beyond whatever processing is needed for purposes of simply accepting 
what he’s being told. In the scenario imagined, Ted is what Alvin Goldman (2001) has re-
ferred to as a non-discriminating reflector of his sources, in that Ted is equally likely to be-
lieve what his sources are telling him, whether they’re telling him something that’s true or 
something that’s false. Moreover, Ted is not the kind of person that’s going whichever way 
his sources go because he has good reason to believe that they’re reliable sources. That is, 
he’s not a reliable judge of reliable judges on the relevant matter.3 His trust in his sources is 
properly characterized as blind. 
Is what Ted is doing in any way epistemically problematic? Locke, for one, suggests 
that ‘it is not worth while to be concerned what he says or thinks, who says or thinks only as 
he is directed by another’ (2008/1689, p. 1). This is, presumably, because the beliefs of such a 
person lack the relevant epistemic status. For example, some epistemologists working on tes-
timony have suggested that the hearer must engage in some form of vetting of the speaker 
throughout their exchange in order to acquire justified testimonial belief (Fricker 2006a and 
1994), and that a speaker accepting what a reliable source is telling her in the absence of posi-
tive reasons to think that the source is reliable would be irrational (Lackey 2008). If either of 
these points about justification and rationality is correct—and we will consider them as well 
as others at length in what follows—the kind of cognitive outsourcing practiced by Ted is 
bound to be problematic.  
So, are these points correct? More specifically, our question will be this: Is there an ep-
istemic problem about Ted’s cognitive outsourcing as such? To ask whether something is an 
epistemic problem is to ask whether it is a problem for the subject’s ability to acquire true 
belief and avoid false belief. I’ll have more to say about this instrumentalist assumption in a 
moment. But first: what is it to have a problem as such? Consider two scenarios. In the first 
scenario, rather than booting up, my computer shows a screen featuring a folder with a ques-
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 See Coady (2006), who argues that you can be a non-discriminating reflector while still being a relia-
ble judge of reliable judges. (A similar point is made by Lackey 2013.) I will not take a stand on that 
issue here; it suffices to note for present purposes that, if there can be such non-discriminating reflec-
tors, Ted is not that kind of non-discriminating reflector. 
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tion mark. The problem of my computer not booting up will be solved by, and only by, my 
replacing the crashed hard drive. For that reason, we may say that I have a problem with the 
hard drive as such. To say that I have a problem with x as such is to say that I cannot both 
solve the problem and leave x as is. In the second scenario, I sometimes burn my food when 
using a frying pan. The problem of my sometimes burning the food will be solved by my 
lowering the heat, using more oil or stirring the food more frequently. In this scenario, I don’t 
have a problem with heat as such, nor do I have one with oil or stirring as such. For each of 
these factors (heat, oil and stirring), I can solve the problem of my burning my food while 
leaving that factor as is. I do not need to attend to all factors to solve the problem; attending 
to one of them will suffice. In other words, to ask whether there is an epistemic problem 
about cognitive outsourcing as such is to ask whether any such problem is more like the hard 
drive or the frying pan scenario, and specifically whether we may solve any epistemic prob-
lem with such outsourcing while leaving the relevant kind and degree of outsourcing as is.  
In the remainder of the paper, I will argue that, if we consider the five most plausible 
candidate epistemic problems raised by cognitive outsourcing—i.e., unreliability (Section 2), 
gullibility (Section 3), irrationality (Section 4), dependency (Section 5), and lack of epistemic 
autonomy (Section 6)—we will see for each problem that it is either not an epistemic prob-
lem, or not a problem about cognitive outsourcing as such. This, I will conclude, suggests that 
there is no epistemic problem about cognitive outsourcing as such (Section 7). 
Two potential misgivings about the present investigation need to be addressed right 
away.
4
 First, it might be suggested that there’s something thoroughly unsurprising about its 
conclusion, given the underlying, instrumentalist framework. If what matters is the attainment 
of true belief and avoidance of error, surely the means of attainment—be it blind trust or oth-
erwise—don’t matter. However, some instrumentalists seem hesitant to embrace this condi-
tional, and part of the motivation for the present investigation is to show that that hesitation is 
misguided. A good example here is Alvin Goldman, if only because he is the most prominent 
epistemic instrumentalist in contemporary epistemology.
5
 Goldman (2001) suggests that blind 
trust is incompatible with justification and that it, if prevalent, on that account would ‘leave 
us with testimonial skepticism concerning rational justification’ (p. 86). For that reason, he 
sets out to identify ways that would render the testimonial exchange, and that between experts 
and novices in particular, ‘more one of justified credence than blind trust’ (p. 109). But given 
Goldman’s instrumentalism, it’s not clear why he should take there to be such a clear contrast 
between blind trust and justified testimonial belief. Again, if what matters is the attainment of 
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true belief and avoidance of error, the means of attainment don’t matter. That, at least, is the 
point the present investigation will attempt to drive home to fellow instrumentalists. 
What about the non-instrumentalist? She is likely to embrace aforementioned condi-
tional, but take it to provide a reductio of instrumentalism. More specifically, she might sug-
gest that the very fact that instrumentalism entails that there is no epistemic problem as such 
with cognitive outsourcing of the type under consideration suggests that instrumentalism is 
false. I will attempt to show that that suggestion is mistaken. Elsewhere, I have argued that 
epistemic instrumentalism invokes the correct axiology (Ahlstrom-Vij 2013a and b), provides 
a defensible account of epistemic justification (Ahlstrom-Vij and Dunn 2014 and forthcom-
ing), and offers non-trivial yet plausible social epistemological recommendations (Ahlstrom-
Vij 2013c). More to the present point, in working my way through each candidate problem 
for cognitive outsourcing in what follows, I hope to show that the instrumentalist’s verdict in 
each instance is intuitively plausible, and moreover in accordance with established epistemic 
practices. Consequently, the worry that the instrumentalist’s take on cognitive outsourcing 
will make for a reductio will turn out to lack any merit. 
Without further ado, let us consider the different candidate problems. 
 
2. Unreliability 
As for the first potential problem, let’s assume that Ted’s sources are unreliable. That’s an 
epistemic problem since it puts him at risk of forming false beliefs, in so far as he cognitively 
outsources to those sources. But is it a problem about cognitive outsourcing as such? I will 
argue that it is not.  
Remember, to say that there’s a problem about x as such, is to say that we can’t both 
solve the problem and leave x as is. The problem under consideration is that of unreliable be-
lief-formation on the part of Ted. There are (at least)
6
 two ways to solve that problem. Either 
Ted has to become competent enough at evaluating testimony for him to be able to screen out 
false testimony, or it has to become the case that his sources are reliable testifiers. These are 
independently sufficient conditions for avoiding unreliable belief-formation on the part of 
Ted. Consequently, there is something we can do to solve the problem of unreliable belief-
formation, while keeping constant Ted’s cognitive outsourcing, and that is to ensure that his 
sources are reliable testifiers. That not only solves the epistemic problem—he will no longer 
be unreliable for relying on his sources in the manner that he does—but also suggests that the 
problem of unreliable belief-formation is not a problem about cognitive outsourcing as such. 
In that respect, Ted’s situation is analogous to the frying pan scenario in Section 1, not the 
hard drive scenario. 
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It might be objected that seeing to it that Ted’s sources are reliable is easier said than 
done. However, that being the case does not give us any reason to prefer improving Ted’s 
competency when it comes to screening out false testimony to improving his sources. The 
reason is two-fold: 
First, while certainly not a trivial task, improving the quality of people’s sources is 
something we often do. Consider educational contexts, in which we work hard not only to 
ensure that the teachers involved are qualified and informed, but also that the material availa-
ble to the students is accurate and informative. In so doing, we are in effect trying to construct 
for the students a friendly epistemic environment in which they can simply trust what they’re 
being told and what they’re reading, in much the same way as we can imagine we are to do 
with Ted. Moreover, there is nothing unique about the educational context in this respect. To 
the contrary, given the prevalence of cognitive bias and overconfidence—including overcon-
fidence about one’s relative insusceptibility to bias—a similar strategy of constructing friend-
ly epistemic environments will be applicable within a variety of domains. Consider, for ex-
ample, the legal domain, where the role of the judge as well as a variety of procedural rules 
serve to ensure that the fact-finding of the jury proceeds in a manner that minimizes the role 
of bias and ignorance. Or consider the scientific domain, where a variety of methodological 
rules serves to counteract individual fallibility through a heavily curated and thereby support-
ive epistemic environment.
7
 
Second, even if we grant that improving Ted’s sources will be a non-trivial task, im-
proving Ted’s competency is likely to prove equally if not more difficult. For one thing, when 
it comes to determining someone’s sincerity, experimental research suggests that people bare-
ly beat chance. Indeed, as noted by Timothy Levine and colleagues, ‘that deception detection 
accuracy rates are only slightly better than fifty-fifty is among the most well documented and 
commonly held conclusions in deception research’ (1999, p. 126). For another, when it comes 
to gauging someone’s competency, in so far as the information provided by the sources fall 
outside of Ted’s expertise (which might be the reason that he’s relying on them in the first 
place), it will be a substantial task, to say the least, for him to acquire the knowledge neces-
sary for determining what’s true and what’s false in a reliable manner.8 
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 Hence, according to Hardwig (1985), the central role of trust in layman-expert interactions. This is 
compatible with there being indirect strategies for gauging the reliability of experts by laymen, e.g., 
along the lines suggested by Goldman (2001). However, as Goldman himself acknowledges, this is by 
no means a trivial task: ‘the situations facing novices are often daunting’ and raise questions about 
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A more serious objection is that seeing to it that Ted’s sources are reliable testifiers, as 
opposed to improving his discriminatory capacities, merely serves to trade one epistemic 
problem for another. Earlier, we compared Ted’s situation to the frying pan scenario from 
Section 1, because, in both cases, there are several independent things we can do in order to 
solve the relevant problem. However, there being several independent things we can do to 
solve the problem is compatible with some nevertheless being preferable to others. For exam-
ple, when cooking, adding more oil might be unhealthy. Similarly, we might worry that solv-
ing the problem of unreliable belief-formation by ‘fixing’ Ted’s sources rather than Ted is 
problematic on account of the fact that he will remain gullible in trusting his sources whatever 
they tell him. This brings us to the second potential problem with cognitive outsourcing. 
 
3. Gullibility 
Assume that Ted’s sources are reliable. As we have just seen, we might worry that he will 
nevertheless be gullible. What is gullibility? According to Elizabeth Fricker, ‘the hearer 
should always engage in some assessment of the speaker for trustworthiness. To believe 
without doing so is to believe blindly, uncritically. This is gullibility’ (1994, p. 145). More 
specifically, Fricker suggests that a person is gullible ‘if she has a disposition or policy for 
doxastic response to testimony which fails to screen out false testimony’ (2006a, p. 620), and 
accepts Goldberg and Henderson’s (2006) interpretation to the effect that a person is gullible 
if she ‘is disposed to acquire a good deal of unreliable (unsafe; insensitive; etc.) testimony-
based belief’ (p. 602). Since Ted’s sources are reliable, and he accepts whatever they tell him, 
he is not gullible in the sense of being unreliable. But maybe he is gullible in the sense of 
forming unsafe or insensitive beliefs? Let us consider each possibility in turn. 
 
3.1 Lack of safety 
Following Ernest Sosa (2007), we may take an unsafe belief to be a belief that, while true in 
the actual world, ‘might […] too easily have been false though formed on the same experien-
tial basis’ (p. 3). A classic example of unsafe belief is provided by Goldman’s (1976) fake 
barn scenario, where a person happens to perceptually single out the only genuine barn in a 
district that, unbeknownst to her, is populated almost exclusively by fake but very convinc-
ing-looking barns. The perceptual belief she forms as a result (‘That’s a barn’, say) is true, 
and perhaps even reliably formed, but unsafe on account of how relying on the same percep-
tual processes in nearby worlds easily could’ve issued in a false belief. 
                                                                                                                                                        
‘[w]hat kinds of education, for example, could substantially improve the ability of novices to appraise 
expertise’ (p. 109). 
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By the same token, Ted’s beliefs will be unsafe if his sources just happen to be located 
and epistemically related in such a fortuitous way that they consistently end up not leading 
him astray; had the world been just slightly different, the delicate epistemic circumstances 
underpinning their status as reliable sources would be destroyed. That would be an epistemic 
problem for Ted in the actual world, in that it would imply a modal risk of having him form 
false beliefs, despite his sources being reliable in the actual world, and there as such not being 
any probabilistic risk of false belief for him. But the question remains: would such a modal 
risk constitute an epistemic problem about cognitive outsourcing as such? 
The answer is ‘no,’ since reliability across nearby worlds implies safety. More specifi-
cally, if Ted’s sources are reliable across nearby worlds, and we hold constant the experiential 
basis for Ted’s beliefs in those worlds—i.e., across nearby worlds, Ted forms his beliefs by 
simply taking on board whatever his sources are telling him—then the beliefs he form in the 
actual world might not too easily have been false. Note that ‘Ted’s sources’ are here to be 
read non-rigidly. In other words, Ted is not necessarily relying on the same sources in nearby 
world as in the actual world. Consequently, saying that Ted’s sources are reliable across near-
by worlds is to say that, whatever sources Ted is relying on in the actual or in nearby possible 
words, those sources are reliable. 
Moreover, the fact that reliability across nearby worlds implies safety means that, if 
Ted’s sources are not reliable across nearby worlds, and he on that account can be said to be 
gullible in a manner that has him form unsafe beliefs, then that will constitute an epistemic 
problem—it puts him at (modal) risk of forming false beliefs—but not an epistemic problem 
about cognitive outsourcing as such. This is because unsafe belief-formation can be avoided 
either by having Ted be competent in evaluating testimony across nearby worlds, or—as just 
noted—by having his sources be reliable testifiers across nearby worlds. Consequently, there 
is something we can do to solve the problem of unsafe belief-formation, while keeping con-
stant Ted’s cognitive outsourcing, and that is to ensure that his sources are reliable testifiers 
across nearby worlds. 
Of course, seeing to it that Ted’s sources are reliable across nearby worlds is by no 
means a trivial task—but neither is seeing to it that Ted is a competent evaluator of testimony 
across nearby worlds. In this respect, a point perfectly analogous to the one made above about 
the comparative difficulty of ‘fixing’ Ted’s sources versus ‘fixing’ Ted applies here, too. In 
particular, ensuring that sources are reliable across nearby worlds is something we often do. 
Return to the education example from Section 2. Not only do we strive to ensure that teachers 
are competent and teaching material is accurate, but we also make sure that, were a teacher to 
get sick, the substitute teacher would be competent, too; and were the primary textbooks to go 
missing, the other books available in the school library would also be accurate and informa-
tive; and so forth. And when do so, we are protecting the safety of the students’ beliefs, by 
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making sure that they would be reliably formed, not only in this world, but also in nearby 
possible worlds. Again, while not a trivial task, it is a task we often take on, and one that it 
moreover would seem unreasonably pessimistic to suggest that we don’t often succeed in. 
 
3.2 Two types of insensitivity 
A line of thought analogous to the one that we just applied to the modal risk of unsafe belief-
formation can be used to address the related concern that Ted’s cognitive outsourcing is an 
epistemic problem on account of Ted not being sensitive to defeaters, i.e., to considerations 
speaking against his beliefs. Remember, Ted’s trust in his sources can be properly character-
ized as blind. But why is that a problem? After all, since Ted’s sources are reliable, it is un-
likely that there will be any defeaters for Ted to pick up on, and as such likely that Ted will 
pick up on any defeaters that there are, namely none. However, according to Lackey (2008), 
the problem with agents trivially satisfying any defeater condition in this manner is that doing 
so ‘does not indicate any sort of sensitivity on the part of the subject to evidence either for or 
against her own beliefs’ (p. 199). Since deferring blindly, Ted is not sensitive in this manner. 
Does that make for an epistemic problem about his cognitive outsourcing as such? 
Insensitivity to defeaters is an epistemic problem for Ted, if it puts him at risk of form-
ing false beliefs. Since his sources are reliable, his insensitivity to defeaters does not put him 
at any significant risk of forming false belief in the actual world. However, he might still be 
at risk in the modal sense that, if there were any defeaters, he would not have picked up on 
them. If that is an epistemic problem, there are two ways to solve it: either Ted has to become 
sensitive to evidence for or against his beliefs across nearby worlds, or his sources need to 
become reliable testifiers across nearby worlds. Consequently, there is something we can do 
for purposes of avoiding the risk of forming false beliefs, while keeping constant Ted’s cogni-
tive outsourcing, and that is—yet again—to ensure that his sources are reliable testifiers 
across nearby worlds. That suggests that any problem on the part of Ted about the relevant 
kind of insensitivity to defeaters is not a problem about cognitive outsourcing as such. 
That said, there is a different, modal notion of sensitivity available in the literature, de-
fended at one point by Robert Nozick (1981, p. 179) in his account of knowledge, to the ef-
fect that a belief that p on the part of S is sensitive if and only if, if p were false, S would not 
believe that p. Alternatively, sensitivity might be understood in terms of the agent not being 
likely to believe that p if false, as suggested by Sosa (2007, p. 25). Is insensitivity, in this 
sense, a problem for Ted? 
It’s not clear that it is. More specifically, if it is a problem, it is not a problem about ep-
istemic outsourcing as such. After all, in so far as insensitivity is a problem for Ted, it’s pos-
sible to solve the problem by making sure that Ted’s sources are perfectly or highly reliable 
across all worlds, while leaving Ted’s cognitive outsourcing as is. It might be objected that, in 
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contrast with steps that can be taken with respect to nearby worlds, it’s simply not feasible to 
see to it that Ted’s sources are perfectly or highly reliable across all worlds. But this point 
cuts both ways, as the same would go for seeing to it that Ted himself becomes perfectly or 
highly reliable in the relevant domains across all worlds. That is why any difficulties involved 
in securing the relevant level of reliability does not provide an argument against cognitive 
outsourcing, so much as an argument for a kind of skepticism. Consequently, it should come 
as no surprise that few epistemologists today are attracted to this idea of modal sensitivity in 
the first place.
9
 
Consequently, there is no problem about gullibility on account of unreliability, since 
Ted’s sources are reliable, and to the extent that there is a problem about gullibility on ac-
count of unsafe belief-formation, an insensitivity to defeaters, or an insensitivity of the kind 
discussed by Nozick, that is for the reasons provided above not an epistemic problem about 
cognitive outsourcing as such. 
 
4. Irrationality 
Let us assume that Ted’s sources are reliable across nearby worlds, in line with what was ar-
gued in Section 3. Even so, we might worry that it’s somehow irrational for him to trust his 
sources, in so far as he does not know anything about their credentials, and as such lacks posi-
tive reason to believe that his sources are reliable. Lackey (2008) suggests as much in relation 
to a case very similar to that of Ted’s—a case she borrows from Fricker (2002). Lackey asks 
us to imagine ‘a person receiving testimony over the internet, with absolutely no epistemical-
ly relevant information about the source of the testimony’ (p. 170, fn. 32). To trust the source 
under these conditions would be irrational, according to Lackey. 
Whether that is correct depends on what we mean by ‘irrational’, of course.10 The term 
‘irrational’ is sometimes applied to actions, and specifically to actions that are detrimental to 
the actor’s ends. That, however, is not the notion relevant here, as we—Lackey included—for 
present purposes are interested in irrationality in an epistemic (or theoretical) rather than prac-
tical sense. A better candidate is therefore epistemic irrationality as doxastic inconsistency. 
However, since the case imagined above does not involve Ted believing any contradiction, 
that notion of irrationality cannot be the one relevant here either. A third candidate notion 
identifies epistemic irrationality with what it is reasonable for the agent to believe, given her 
evidence. The problem with invoking this notion, however, is that it amounts to simply restat-
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 See Sosa (1999) for a classic critique of the idea that knowledge requires sensitivity, and a defense of 
a safety condition on knowledge. In later work, Sosa (2007) has rejected the idea that safety is required 
for knowledge, in order to solve the problem of dream skepticism. 
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 The following line of reasoning develops an argument originally presented in Ahlstrom-Vij (2015). 
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ing the original demand for positive reasons, as follows: As far as Ted’s (non-existent) evi-
dence is concerned, he lacks any reason to consider his source reliable. However, this obser-
vation goes no lengths whatsoever towards answering the question relevant here, namely: 
Why should we take the absence of such reasons to indicate any irrationality on his part? 
One possible answer is that there is something epistemically blameworthy about trust-
ing sources when one lacks any positive reasons for thinking them reliable. The relevant tar-
get of blame in Lackey’s example is the subject’s acceptance of the relevant reports,11 where 
I take it that the relevant kind of acceptance involves the subject believing what is reported. 
However, we can only be blamed for what is up to us, and belief-formation is not up to us—
belief formation is something that happens to us rather than something that we do—given the 
truth of doxastic involuntarism, so that cannot be it either.
12
 
It might be argued that Ted is blameworthy, not for believing what his sources are tell-
ing him, but for not seeking out information about their epistemic credentials, and clearly the 
latter is within his voluntary control. However, given that his sources are reliable—indeed, 
even reliable across nearby worlds—it’s not clear what the point of such blame is supposed to 
be. Say that Ted did what we’re supposedly to blame him for not doing, i.e., seek out the rel-
evant information. If he does a good job, he’ll find that his sources, indeed, are reliable, and 
that he on that account should keep outsourcing to them. In that scenario, he’ll be no better off 
epistemically for having put in the relevant work. If anything, he has wasted time and effort 
for no epistemic gain. If, by contrast, he does a bad job, and reaches the (false) conclusion 
that his sources are not reliable, he might very well be epistemically worse off for having put 
in the work, since that might lead him to either outsource to other, potentially unreliable 
sources, or to try to settle the questions previously left to his sources on his own, and quite 
possibly do a worse job than his reliable sources do. In other words, in blaming him in the 
relevant manner, we seem to be encouraging Ted not to do better than he currently is, and to 
potentially do worse. For that reason, it’s not clear that it makes any sense to blame Ted in the 
situation imagined. 
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 See Lackey (2008: 170). 
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 See, e.g., Alston (2005). See also Nottelmann (2006) for a discussion of some dissenting voices, as 
well as further arguments to the effect that doxastic voluntarism is and remains implausible. What if we 
read Lackey as being concerned with something like Cohen’s (1989) notion of acceptance, as a volun-
tary adopting of some proposition as a premise in one’s deliberation? So long as accepting what’s true 
is  not a fundamental epistemic goal—and I see no reason to think that it is—any practice of praising or 
blaming someone for what they accept would simply be an instrument to getting people to believe 
what’s true and steering them away from what’s false. And if so, it’s not clear what reason we would 
have for blaming Ted, given that his sources are in fact reliable, and as such are directing him well. 
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Another possible answer grants the above point about epistemic blameworthiness, but 
calls attention to the fact that there is still something epistemically valuable about rationality. 
This answer calls our attention to the possibility of rationality being related to our epistemic 
goals in either of two ways. On the one hand, rationality might be related to our epistemic 
goals instrumentally. In that case, however, our pursuit of rationality should fall in line with 
our pursuit of truth, with the consequence that Ted is not irrational for trusting his sources, 
since they after all are reliable. On the other hand, rationality might be taken to be an epistem-
ic goal in its own right. If so, it might be that Ted is irrational when believing on the basis of 
the online communications from his fellow inquirers in the sense that, while doing so might 
promote his reliability, it fails to promote some separate, sui generis goal of rationality. As I 
have argued elsewhere, however, it is not clear that we have reason to assume any epistemic 
goals beyond the dual goal of believing truly and not believing falsely.
13
 
None of this is to deny that we might often go astray when trusting someone despite 
lacking positive reason to think her trustworthy. Still, it is a mistake to promote that empirical 
generalization (which might or might not be well-founded) to a conceptual truth about ra-
tionality, particularly given that it’s not clear that there’s a viable notion of rationality that 
generates the verdict that Ted would be irrational for trusting his sources while lacking posi-
tive reasons to believe that they are reliable. And if that’s so, it’s also not clear that there is an 
epistemic problem of irrationality about cognitive outsourcing, let alone about cognitive out-
sourcing as such. 
 
5. Dependency 
Assume, yet again, that Ted’s sources are reliable across nearby worlds. If what has been ar-
gued so far is correct, there is under that assumption no problem of gullibility about cognitive 
outsourcing as such, nor does there seem to be a sense in which Ted is irrational for trusting 
his sources in the absence of positive reasons for considering them reliable. Still, we might 
worry that his situation involves a problematic form of epistemic dependency. That Ted de-
pends on his sources should be uncontroversial. But we depend on others in all kinds of 
ways—I depend in very real ways on my spouse, for example—and not all relations of de-
pendency are problematic. Consequently, for the relevant worry to have any bite, we need to 
identify some way in which the kind of dependency manifested by Ted is unhealthy. 
The worry cannot be that Ted’s dependency is unhealthy on account of bringing him to 
form false belief, and as such rendering him unreliable. Again, we are assuming that his 
sources are reliable. But maybe the worry is that we cannot all be like Ted. After all, some of 
us have to conduct inquiry on our own, in order for others to be able to outsource their infor-
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mation collection and processing. While that’s true, however, it does not go to show that 
there’s anything objectionable about the arrangement imagined in the case of Ted. More spe-
cifically, while it goes to show that there is dependency, it does not go to show that there is 
anything unhealthy about that dependency. Just consider our dependency on scientific experts 
within a wide variety of domains. Is that dependency worrisome, just because the relevant 
expert-laymen arrangement would be impossible in the absence of experts? It’s not clear that 
it is. It certainly would be worrisome if the relevant experts were leading us astray. But that’s 
not a worry about dependency; that’s a worry about unreliability, and as noted above there’s 
no worry about unreliability in Ted’s case. 
Maybe the worry is that, were Ted’s sources to disappear, that would be bad, since he 
in that case would run the risk of outsourcing to unreliable sources. But that cannot be it ei-
ther. Remember, ‘Ted’s sources’ should be read non-rigidly. Consequently, while the particu-
lar sources that Ted is relying on in the actual world might not be present in nearby possible 
worlds, in so far as Ted is forming beliefs in a safe manner by outsourcing his information 
collection and processing, there will in those worlds be other sources fulfilling the same func-
tion. Consequently, we can infer from the safety of his cognitively outsourced belief-
formation that, whatever the identity of the sources he would be outsourcing to in nearby 
worlds, those sources are reliable. 
What if Ted is not forming beliefs in a safe manner? In that case, we’re back to the 
worry discussed in relation to gullibility and safety above (Section 3.1). As was noted there, 
there are two ways of solving the epistemic problem of Ted forming beliefs in an unsafe 
manner, namely by either seeing to it that Ted becomes competent at evaluating testimony 
across nearby worlds, or by ensuring that his sources are reliable across nearby worlds. Add 
to this the observation that we don’t necessarily hold his sources constant across possible 
worlds (i.e., the sources he relies on in the actual world might not be identical to the ones he 
relies on in nearby worlds), and we may conclude that, in so far as lack of safety on account 
of cognitive outsourcing is an epistemic problem, it’s not an epistemic problem about cogni-
tive outsourcing as such. And, again, while it would not be a trivial task to see to it that Ted’s 
sources are reliable across nearby worlds, it’s something we often do successfully. 
 
6. Lack of epistemic autonomy 
At several points in the above, I’ve suggested that there are two ways of solving epistemic 
problems, namely by seeing to it that Ted becomes competent at evaluating the testimony of 
his sources, or ensuring that his sources are reliable (possibly across nearby worlds). Some-
one skeptical about cognitive outsourcing might suggest that this leaves out a third, more de-
sirable option: having Ted conduct the relevant lines of inquiry on his own, without relying 
on his sources. That option is more desirable, it might be argued, on account of how it in-
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volves Ted manifesting epistemic autonomy of a kind that’s more or less completely absent in 
cases where he’s engaging in cognitive outsourcing, and only present to a modest degree in 
cases where he’s relying on his sources while competently evaluating them for trustworthi-
ness. Which raises a question: what exactly is it to be epistemically autonomous?
14
 
 
6.1. The dual-aspect conception of epistemic autonomy 
According to Fricker (2006b), an epistemically autonomous person ‘takes no one else’s word 
for anything but accepts only what she has found out for herself, relying only on her own 
cognitive faculties and investigative inferential powers’ (p. 225). Similarly, Linda Zagzebski 
(2007) suggests that an epistemically autonomous person that finds out that someone else be-
lieves p ‘will demand proof of p that she can determine by the use of her own faculties, given 
her own previous beliefs, but she will never believe anything on testimony’ (p. 252). In light 
of these characterizations, we may distinguish between two aspects of epistemic autonomy, 
one negative and one positive. As for the negative aspect, the epistemically autonomous indi-
vidual does not rely on the word of others. As for the positive aspect, what she does instead is 
conduct her own inquiry, while relying only on her own epistemic capabilities and resources. 
Let us refer to this as the dual-aspect conception of epistemic autonomy. 
It is surprisingly difficult to find any defenders of this conception. The two most plau-
sible candidates are Locke and Kant. Consider Locke’s (2008/1690) famous contention that 
‘[t]he floating of other Men’s Opinions in our brains makes us not one jot more knowing, 
though they happen to be true’ (p. 52)—a contention that has C. A. J. Coady (1992) character-
ize Locke as a representative of ‘an individualist ideology’ (p. 13). This speaks to the nega-
tive aspect of epistemic autonomy. Indeed, Alvin Plantinga (2000) describes Locke as part of 
an Enlightenment culture that ‘looked askance at testimony and tradition’ and moreover sug-
gests that ‘Locke saw [testimony and tradition] as a preeminent source of error’ (p. 147). Fi-
nally, consider Immanuel Kant’s (1951/1790) claim that one of the three maxims of sensus 
communis and the very motto of the Enlightenment is to ‘think for oneself’ (pp. 294-5). This 
speaks to the positive aspect of epistemic autonomy. By implication, it also speaks to the neg-
ative aspect, at least if we’re to trust Frederick Schmitt (1987), who argues that, according to 
Kant, ‘testimonial evidence is not the sort of thing on which an intellectually autonomous 
subject would rely’ (p. 46). 
However, Joseph Shieber has argued that these readings greatly exaggerate Kant and 
Locke’s hostility towards testimony. According to Shieber (2010), Kant’s emphasis on the 
need to think for oneself is restricted to the philosophical, moral, and mathematical. More 
than that, on empirical matters, Kant leaves room for a prima facie entitlement to believe the 
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assertions of others, in a manner not too different from modern anti-reductionists about testi-
mony.
15
 Shieber (2009) also argues that the passage regarding ‘[t]he floating of other Men’s 
Opinions in our brains’ concerns only ‘rational and contemplative knowledge’, or what we 
today might refer to as philosophical knowledge. Moreover, as to testimony on empirical 
matters, the key word is ‘Opinions’, since Locke, according to Shieber, leaves ample room for 
the knowledge of others providing a proper epistemic ground for testimonial belief. 
Perhaps it shouldn’t come as a surprise that it’s hard to find any defenders of the dual-
aspect conception. After all, it’s a very easy epistemological target. As Inwood (2005) writes, 
the ‘demand that an individual should subject all his beliefs to criticism, and accept nothing 
on authority […] is thwarted by the gulf between any given individual’s meagre first-hand 
experience and the range of knowledge now available to him’ (par. 5). Similarly, Plantinga 
(2000) points out that ‘you can’t know so much as your name or what city you live in without 
relying on testimony’ (p. 147). Indeed, for the great majority of things that we know about 
phenomena beyond our immediate temporal and geographical location, we depend on others 
for our knowledge, and this epistemic debt to others could be cashed in only at an exorbitant 
cost. As John Hardwig (1985) notes, ‘if I were to pursue epistemic autonomy across the 
board, I would succeed only in holding uninformed, unreliable, crude, untested, and therefore 
irrational beliefs’ (p. 340). 
 
6.2 Epistemic autonomy as an ideal to aspire to 
At this point, the defender of the dual-aspect conception of epistemic autonomy might grant 
that most of us would probably be far worse off epistemically if we tried to rely only on our 
own limited epistemic capacities in finding out things about the world, but maintain that this 
does not go to show that epistemic autonomy is not still an ideal to aspire to. And what is 
problematic about cognitive outsourcing of the kind Ted is engaging in, she might argue, is 
exactly that it prevents us from aspiring to this ideal. 
However, there are reasons to think that epistemic autonomy, in the dual-aspect sense, is 
not an ideal to aspire to, at least not for creatures like us. For something to constitute an ideal, 
that something would arguably have to be maximally good along some relevant dimension. 
For the sake of argument, let us assume what is far from obviously true, namely that epistem-
ic autonomy is an ideal in this sense. Even on that assumption, it doesn’t follow that we have 
reason to aspire to epistemic autonomy. To see why, consider an analogy with political sys-
tems. In particular, imagine some ideal political state. Then, assume that the only way to 
move from our current state to the ideal state is by way of a violent and bloody revolution. 
Given these assumptions, we have a situation wherein some state is ideal without it being the 
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case that we have reason to aspire for it. In fact, if the means required to realize the ideal state 
are violent and bloody enough, we might even have reason not to aspire for that state. 
An analogous point can be made about epistemic autonomy. Even if we assume that be-
ing epistemically autonomous is an ideal—and we are, as noted above, granting that assump-
tion for the sake of argument—it does not follow that we should aspire to become epistemi-
cally autonomous. The reason has already been provided in Section 6.1: for limited creatures 
like us, attempting not to rely on the word of others, and to instead conduct our own lines of 
inquiry while relying only on our own competencies and abilities, is likely to make us epis-
temically worse off by a significant margin than we are when allowing ourselves to rely on 
others. As a result, even if being in a state of epistemic autonomy would in fact have us in-
habit some ideal epistemic state, the high epistemic cost of attempting to become epistemical-
ly autonomous gives us strong reason not to attempt to approximate that state. 
Consequently, even if we assume that epistemic autonomy is an ideal, the fact remains 
that, since the epistemic cost of achieving epistemic autonomy is forbidding, and we on that 
account don’t have reason to aspire for such autonomy, it’s not clear that there’s anything ob-
jectionable about Ted being prevented from aspiring thus. For that reason, the objection under 
consideration doesn’t give us any reason to think that there’s an epistemic problem about ep-
istemic outsourcing on account of it preventing us from aspiring to that ideal. 
 
6.3 Epistemic autonomy as appropriate dependence 
What was argued in Section 6.2 counts against the idea that the dual-aspect conception of ep-
istemic autonomy designates a state to which we have reason to aspire. In fact, we might even 
have positive reason not to aspire to it, given the epistemic costs of so doing. But maybe there 
is a different, more plausible notion of epistemic autonomy on offer.  
Consider Robert Roberts and Jay Wood’s (2007) conception of epistemic autonomy. 
Roberts and Wood are sensitive to the point that, if we take autonomy to be a matter of an 
individual going about her epistemic business in a manner that involves taking no direction 
from others, ‘[t]he prospects of […] an “autonomous” individual having any light on anything 
are dim indeed’ (p. 260). For this reason, Roberts and Wood incorporate a normative element 
into their notion of autonomy, rendering dependence on others perfectly compatible with au-
tonomous agency. An autonomous individual, they suggest, is an individual ‘who has been, 
and continues to be, properly regulated by others’ (p. 260), and when it comes to trusting the 
word of others, ‘the autonomous individual is disposed to be cautious about testimony in 
whatever way is right for the circumstances—sometimes very cautious, sometimes implicitly 
trusting’ (p. 270). 
One clear virtue of Roberts and Wood’s notion of epistemic autonomy is that it does not 
place any unreasonable demands on our abilities to conduct inquiry in isolation from others. 
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Might their notion even be able to accommodate Ted? Given the reliability of Ted’s sources, 
together with our failure to identify any problem with Ted’s cognitive outsourcing in the 
above, to be appropriately dependent on others for Ted is compatible with being very de-
pendent on others. As such, Roberts and Wood’s notion of epistemic autonomy is not incom-
patible with cognitive outsourcing. Indeed, if to be epistemically autonomous is to be appro-
priately dependent on others, and practicing cognitive outsourcing serves to improve one’s 
epistemic situation, it might even be that such outsourcing may serve to increase one’s auton-
omy. In other words, Roberts and Wood’s notion of epistemic autonomy is perfectly compat-
ible with cognitive outsourcing.
16
 
 
7. Conclusion 
Section 6 argued that available notions of epistemic autonomy designate phenomena that are 
either perfectly compatible with cognitive outsourcing, or such that we lack reason to aspire 
to attain them. As such, it seems there is no epistemic problem relating to a lack of epistemic 
autonomy for cognitive outsourcing of the kind Ted engages in. Factoring in what has been 
argued in the preceding sections, we may thereby conclude that there is no epistemic problem 
about cognitive outsourcing as such on the grounds of unreliability, gullibility, irrationality, 
dependency, or lack of epistemic autonomy. In each of these cases, we are either not dealing 
with an epistemic problem (irrationality, dependency, and lack of epistemic autonomy), or not 
dealing with an epistemic problem about cognitive outsourcing as such (unreliability and gul-
libility). As noted at the outset, this hopefully goes some way towards convincing the epis-
temic instrumentalist to embrace the idea that, if what truly matters is the attainment of true 
belief and avoidance of error, the means of attainment—including blind trust—don’t matter, 
while also showing that the instrumentalist’s take on cognitive outsourcing doesn’t provide a 
reductio of her framework, given how its implications coincide with established epistemic 
practices. Naturally, since there might be other problems with cognitive outsourcing that I 
have not discussed, I do not want to suggest that I have conclusively demonstrated that there 
is no epistemic problem about cognitive outsourcing as such. However, given that the candi-
date problems discussed above seem the strongest candidates for constituting such problems, 
the fact that none of them do is good evidence that there is no epistemic problem about cogni-
tive outsourcing as such. 
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